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PATIENTS, PROFESSIONALS, AND THE PATH OF
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: A RESPONSE TO
PETRILA
David B. Wexler*
Bruce J. Winick'"
In his book review Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise
of Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence,' Professor John Petrila
indicts our compilation, Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence,' and
therapeutic jurisprudence generally, for subordinating
patient/consumer interests and endorsing professional dominance.
The indictment lacks probable cause. It evidences a lack of
familiarity with (or a disregard of) much of the therapeutic
jurisprudence literature-including the contributions to this
Symposium-and seriously misreads Essays. Indeed, Petrila puts
words in our mouths and then critiques us for writing a book we did
not (and would not) write.4
© Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
John D. Lyons Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, University of
Arizona.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami
'10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 877 (1993) (this issue).
2 ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick
eds., 1993).
' See generally Bibliography of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 915 (1993).
' Petrila challenges our notion that we should be concerned with the therapeutic
implications of the law. The therapeutic jurisprudence approach, however, sheds light
on the fact that the law (rules, procedures, and legal rules) often produces therapeutic
or antitherapeutic consequences, and it does so whether we want it to or not. Would
Petrila really have us ignore these matters, rather than study them and grapple with them
in an effort to improve the situation? Would ignoring these consequences be in the
interests of patients and consumers? Would he be unconcerned that the current criminal
justice system might itself traumatize sexual battery victims or child victim/witnesses?
Would he suggest a judge imposing probation conditions not be concerned with the type
of judicial behaviors (e.g., speaking clearly and simply, asking defendant to express his
or her understanding) that might lead a defendant to follow-rather than to
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Despite an introduction to Essays that carefully highlights the
importance of values such as autonomy and the integrity of the fact-
finding process, and that repeatedly warns that we are not suggesting
that therapeutic interests "trump" other values, Petrila says we are
saying otherwise. And as to who decides what is therapeutic (or,
presumably,' when therapeutic interests should trump other interests),
Petrila says:
Essays fails to answer the more important question of
who decides what constitutes a therapeutic outcome.
While Wexler and Winick do not address this point
directly, they suggest at least implicitly that research
scientists and lawyers sensitive to research data will
make such decisions. In concluding Part I, which
establishes the rationale for pursuing a therapeutic
jurisprudence agenda, Wexler writes: "[in] the
aftermath of [therapeutic jurisprudence] research and
thinking, the accumulated body of knowledge may be
useful to practicing legal and mental health pro-
fessionals. Indeed, with such knowledge, the profes-
sionals might strive together to reform the law and the
legal system to help counteract mental illness and to
help promote mental health. "6
Absolutely nothing in the above quotation suggests that
lawyers, researchers, or mental health professionals should formulate
law reform proposals without regard to the patient/ consumer
perspective. Further, there is an obvious and crucial difference
between "striving" to change the law and having the actual power to
change it. Ultimately, it is lawmakers, not researchers, who must be
convinced of the merits of a proposal. In fact, in a recent piece by
Wexler, cited by Petrila in his review, Wexler notes the importance
of therapeutic jurisprudence scholars addressing their policy
S See David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 40
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 517, 518.
6 Petrila, supra note 1, at 891-92 (quoting David B. Wexler, An Introduction to
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS, supra note 2 at 38).
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recommendations in a convincing manner to legislators, trial and
appellate judges administrators, and other true decisionmakers.7
We have repeatedly emphasized the fact that therapeutic juris-
prudence is merely a "lens" designed to shed light on interesting and
important empirical and normative issues relating to the therapeutic
impact of the law. The therapeutic jurisprudence perspective sets the
stage for the articulation and debate of those questions,8 and hence
has the potential of reinvigorating the field, 9 but it does not itself
provide any of the answers. As noted in the introduction,
"[tiherapeutic jurisprudence, although it seeks to illuminate the
therapeutic implications of legal practices, does not resolve this
dispute, which requires analysis of the impact of alternative practices
on other relevant values. "10 Petrila faults us at once for not providing
' David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions ofLegal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 17 (1993). See also Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript,
91 MICH. L. REv. 2191, 2196, n.20 (1993), where Judge Edwards, speaking of
"practical interdisciplinary scholarship," notes that "Professor Wexler analyzes a number
of articles-directed to judges, legislators, and other public decisionmakers-that address
concrete problems in mental health law."
' David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 40
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 517 (1992); Robert F. Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Conflicts Among Values in Mental Health Law, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 31 (1993)
(stressing importance of autonomy values).
' Petrila questions the "newness" of therapeutic jurisprudence. So do we.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is merely a sharper conceptualization of and focus on work
that a number of us-including many Symposium participants-had been engaging in
earlier. In fact, David B. Wexler's first book, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE
LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990) [hereinafter LAW AS
AGENT], was composed of an introductory chapter explaining therapeutic jurisprudence,
followed by selections from pre-existing works by a number of writers that fell "im-
plicitly" in the therapeutic jurisprudence framework. Essays, in contrast, consists of
articles written explicitly from a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective. This sharpened
focus has, we believe, helped generate much scholarship that otherwise likely would
have gone unwritten, and, as David B. Wexler, New Directions In Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of Conventional Mental Health Law Scholarship,
10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 759, 765 (1993) (this issue) [hereinafter New Directions]
and Bibliography, supra note 3, indicate, has created a community of therapeutic
jurisprudence scholars interested in law/mental health issues in many fields of law, not
simply in conventional mental health law. In that sense, we hope therapeutic
jurisprudence has helped reinvigorate and restructure the law/mental health field.
10 David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Introduction to ESSAYS, supra note 2, at xii.
910 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. X
the answers and (incorrectly) for providing the answer that
professionals decide what is meant by therapeutic and when
therapeutic interests should prevail.
As Wexler points out, therapeutic jurisprudence, as a mere
lens for better seeing the (legal) world, does not (and ought not)
provide a tight definition of "therapeutic."11 This flexibility has left
scholars free to examine the issue in a number of important and
interesting contexts. Significantly, the patient/consumer perspective
has weighed heavily in those efforts.
For example, Tom Tyler has indicated how the importance of
giving patient/respondents "voice" in commitment proceedings is of
likely therapeutic significance.12 In a recent piece looking at
alternative commitment hearing structures, Wexler asks which
procedure respondents would find fairer. " In Law as Agent, Wexler
addressed right-to-refuse treatment questions by including an essay by
psychiatric researchers who approached the matter by interviewing
about-to-be released patients.14 And psychologist Julie Zito and
associates, in a recent therapeutic jurisprudence right-to-refuse
inquiry, interviewed patients as well as doctors."
In addition, as therapeutic jurisprudence takes us beyond the
subject matter of traditional mental health law, commentators and
investigators are asking how the law impacts therapeutically or
antitherapeutically on persons other than traditional patients. For
example, Gould proposes research to ascertain whether criminal
defendants will find the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fair-and, if not,
how that will impact on their respect for the law, institutional
"Wexler, New Directions, supra note 9.
12 Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433 (1992).
11 Wexler, supra note 8, at 524 ("[Mhich proceeding would the typical respondent
find fairer?").
"' Harold I. Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Patients'
Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, in LAW AS AGENT, supra note 9, at 189. See
also Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical
Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, in LAW AS AGENT, supra note 9,
at 75 (discussing "privilege study" by authors conducted through questionnaires to
patients as will therapists).
1 Julie Magno Zito et al., Toward a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of
Medication Refusal in the Court Review Model, 11 BEHAVIORAL SC. & L. 151 (1993)
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behavior, and recidivism.1 6 Feldthusen examines how sexual battery
victims are treated in the criminal justice system and listens to what
those victims have to say in analyzing whether there is therapeutic
value in bringing tort actions against perpetrators. 7 Shuman begins
the inquiry into whether accident victims will respond better to a
fault-based, as opposed to a no-fault, compensation scheme." And,
as noted in Wexler's New Directions article, Shuman and associates
have taken the trouble to ask persons who have served as jurors in
traumatic criminal cases how that experience has affected them
emotionally. 9 All of these inquiries, and more, have been made in
the name of therapeutic jurisprudence research.
Thus, Petrila's claim that Essays takes us down the wrong
path seems incorrect. Properly understood, therapeutic jurisprudence
simply is a path to greater enlightenment about the law. Petrila also
misinterprets incomplete, shortsighted, and even misleading in his
examination of some of the specific chapters in Essays. Let us look
at some of those examinations.
Petrila discusses Wexler's essay regarding possible reckless
endangerment prosecutions against persons who are dangerous
without medication and who culpably fail to take the medication.2"
Petrila says Wexler's "focus" is on persons with schizophrenia, and
chastises Wexler because (a) most persons with schizophrenia are not
dangerous, and (b) persons with schizophrenia stop taking medication
for a number of understandable reasons.2 It is surprising that Petrila
does not mention serotonin-deficient persons, for the springboard and
the clear focus of Wexler's essay was not persons with schizophrenia,
but violent offenders with a low serotonin function. When
schizophrenia was mentioned, it was mentioned only (a) in the
16 Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Tune for Uncharged, Dismissed, or
Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?,
10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 835, 870 (1993) (this issue).
17 Bruce Feldthusen, The Civil Action for Sexual Battery: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?, 25 OTTAwA L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
11 Daniel W. Shuman, Making the World a Better Place Through Tort Law: Through
the Therapeutic Looking Glass, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 739 (1993) (this issue).
19 Wexler, New Directions, supra note 9, at 769-70 (Para. beginning "While
Feldthusen. .. ").
I Petrila, supra note 1, at 886-87.
21 Id.
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context of that subset of patients "who have a history of violent
behavior when they fail to take antipsychotic medication, ' 22 and
(b) with the recognition of the complication, not as likely to be
present in the serotonin example, that the failure to take antipsychotic
medicine "may not be culpable with regard to the treatment
refusal. "23
Petrila particularly misconstrues Winick's chapters regarding
patient "assent" to hospitalization and treatment.2 Winick analyzes
the difficult area of competence to consent to hospitalization and
treatment, and concludes that, in part to maximize and to capitalize
therapeutically on the patient's choice, the law ought to be fairly
flexible in finding a patient competent when the patient and doctor
agree, though not in situations where the patient's objection to recom-
mended treatment is sought to be overridden on the ground that the
patient is incompetent.25
By minimizing Winick's discussion of the legal treatment of
patient/physician disagreement, Petrila makes it appear that Winick
argues for an expansive view of patient competence in order to
further the interests of the doctor.26 In fact, under Winick's proposal,
flexibility in finding competence follows entirely from the patient's
expressed interest.
Petrila accuses Winick of having an "idealized" view of
doctor/patient relations, and of downplaying the reality of hospital life
and its coercive pressures. 27 But Winick expressly acknowledges that
in "some (perhaps many) understaffed civil mental
hospitals . . . practices have sadly evidenced a conflict of interest on
the part of staff physicians . . ." that should render inapplicable the
' David B. Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance Through the Criminal Law,
in ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 193.
' Id. at 195 (emphasis in original).
2' Petrila, supra note 1, at 893-99.
25 See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction
Between Assent and Objection, in ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 41 [hereinafter Winick,
Competency to Consent to Treatment]; Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to
Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch,
in ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 83 [hereinafter Competency to Consent to Hospitalization].
2 Petrila, supra note 1, at 890-91.
27 Petrila, supra note 1, at 897.
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presumption of competency that he argues is otherwise appropriate in
the patient assent context.28
Ironically, it is Petrila's artificial and idealized view of the
legal system that makes his supposed "real world" analysis falter:
Petrila critiques Winick's supposed naivete, but does not consider the
real world likely implications of rejecting Winick's view. If one
rejects Winick's view of respecting the treatment assent of a patient
of somewhat questionable competency, then a competency inquiry
will be triggered. That inquiry, according to the non-idealized and
non-artificial view confirmed by empirical studies that Winick cites, 29
will almost invariably lead to a decision to treat the patient according
to the plan proposed by the doctor. And the patient will probably be
given the message that, because of seeming mental incompetence, his
or her input or "voice" is of no great concern to the decisionmakers.
However a reader or policymaker may ultimately come out
with regard to the difficult question of patient "assent," it is clear that
Winick's proposal attempts to give meaning to a patient's expressed
desire and is emphatically not designed further to empower
physicians. Winick's recent law review article on autonomy, and his
defense in this Symposium of a broadened right to refuse treatment,
underscore the importance he gives to patient decisionmaking and
choice.3 °
For Petrila to derive from Winick's analysis of the difficult
problem of patient assent, or from a reading of Essays generally, a
view of therapeutic jurisprudence as uninterested in a patient/
consumer perspective is a serious flaw and a total misunderstanding
of our intentions and aspirations. On the other hand, that a person
of Petrila's knowledge, intellect, and accomplishment should so badly
misread us will surely lead us, and undoubtedly others working in
therapeutic jurisprudence, to be constantly vigilant in seeking out a
Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 25, at 66 n.93
I d. at 79 nn. 148-49; Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization,
supra note 25, at 120 nn.165-66.
3o Bruce 1. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL.
L. REv. 1705 (1992); Bruce J. Winick, Psychotropic Medication in the Criminal Trial
Process: The Constitutional and Therapeutic Implications of Riggins v. Nevada, 10
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 637 (1993) (this issue).
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patient/consumer perspective," as Perlin emphasizes in his
introduction to this symposium," and in using empirical work very
carefully (another critique offered by Petrila)33-themes that ran
through the papers, audience discussion, and "corridor talk" at the
New York Law School Symposium on Therapeutic Jurisprudence.
Rather than being unduly deferential to professional dis-
cretion, as Petrila suggests, therapeutic jurisprudence calls for a
"healthy skepticism toward claims of clinical expertise. "'4 Rather
than ignoring the patient/consumer perspective, therapeutic
jurisprudence seeks to focus attention on the extent to which legal
practices have actually served their therapeutic interests (and on the
extent to which they may unintentionally yield antitherapeutic results).
By asking hard questions about the impact of law on the people it is
designed to affect, therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to bring about a
restructuring of mental health law more responsive to the interests,
and desires, of its consumers.
" Sometimes, studies of that perspective may yield results that differ from the
experiences of those ex-patients who regard themselves as victims or survivors. For
instance, a recent analysis of transcripts of interviews with recently admitted patients
revealed that:
When the admission process violates [relevant] moral norms-when the patient
is excluded from participation in the decision about whether he or she should
be hospitalized, when the actions of others appear to be selfishly motivated,
or when others lack the personal or professional qualifications to intervene, or
lie to or disrespect the patient-coercion may be more likely to be perceived,
and resented. When these moral norms are adhered to, many apparently
coercive acts seem to be accepted by the patient as morally legitimate.
Nancy S. Bennett et al., Inclusion, Motivation, and Good Faith: The Morality of
Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 295, 305 (1993)
(emphasis added).
32 Michael J. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM.
RTS. 623 (1993) (this issue).
3 It is puzzling, however, that Petrila criticizes Winick's discussion of deferred
gratification (and its absence) for failure to cite authority, when Winick cites some
authority and specifically calls for additional empirical work to examine the assumption
made. Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the Government
as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, in ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 237
nn.68 & 69.
1 Wexler & Winick, supra note 10, at xi.
